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MORAL CONSIDERATION IN PENNSYLVANIA
A moral obligation is defined by Bouvier as "a duty which one
owes and which he ought to perform but which he is not legally bound
"A moral obligation
to fulfill. " Chief Justice Mitchell has said:in law is defined as one 'which cannot be enforced by action but which
is binding on the party who incurs it, in conscience and according to
natural justice,' and again as 'a duty which would be enforceable by law,
were it not for some positive rule, which, with a view to general benefit,
exempts the party in that particular instance from legal liability.' " 1
The two definitions cited by Justice Mitchell were apparently both
approved, and nothing appears in his opinion to iadioate that he realized
that it is of the greatest importance which of the tw6 is adopted as the
correct definition. That every duty imposed by '"oiscience or natural
justice" would be "enforceable by law, were it not for some positive
rule, which, with a view to general benefit, exetnpts'the party in that
pafticular instance from legal liability," is far ftoml being true; and in
so far as it is not true the two definitions lead to very' different results.
This will appear as we proceed.
Now "it is definitely settled in this state th' t a Woral obligation
is a sufficient consideration to support an express promise." 2
If then a moral obligation is a kind of cos-itelitio.n, let us see
what is meant by consideration. In 1875 the English Court of
Exchequer Chamber said :- "A valuable consider-ation in the sense
of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit
accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or
responsibility, given, suffered or undertaken by the other." 0 Or more
simply, "the consideration of a promise is the thing given or done by
the promisee in exckangefor the promise." 4 Or as Anson expresses
'Bailey vs. Philadelphia, 167 Pa. 569.
2
Per Mitchell, J., in Anderson vs. Best, 176 Pa. 498.
3
Currie vs. Misa, L. R. 10 Ex. 162.
4
Langdell's Summary of Law of Contracts, Sec. 45, p. 58.
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it, it is the thing "done, forborne, or suffered, or promised to be done,
forborne or suffered by the promisee in respect of the promise." 1 It is
of the very essence of the idea that the consideration move "in return
for the promise." 2 To be accurate a definition must emphasize the
causal relation between the promise and the consideration which is
always essential. 3 This definition by the United States Supreme
Court is therefore admirable-any act or forbearance called for and
induced by the promise;" 4 or this one by Justice Trunkey, "some loss
or inconvenience to the promisee upon his entering into the contract, or
some benefit to the promisor." 5
It is held that where a reward is offered for doing something,
which is afterwards done by a person acting in ignorance of the offer,
the reward cannot be recovered, because the service was not rendered
on the faith of the offer. 6 It was not induced by the promise.
Now when a man is induced to make a promise because he is impelled by conscience to do sd, his motive for making that promise is
something exactly contrary to those motives which the law calls considerations. A man may promise to build a house for another. In
making this promise he may be impelled by various motives. He may
have conceived a novel and beautiful architectural scheme and he may
desire an opportunity to acquire fame by exhibiting it in an actual
structure. Again, the promisee may be an impecunious relative in need
of shelter, and the motive may be charity. Or again the promisee may
have offered $ioyoo.for such a house, and the motive would be simply
to secure the reward. There is often a combination of motives. The
presence of inducing -aotives not originating in the contemporaneous
conduct of the promii-.- will not impair the validity of the contract if
the law can find pohinfhng whichit can seizeupon as the supposed incentive, e. g., a nie e nonf~nal consideration such as one dollar. But the
absence of any c6ntetporary conduct of the promisee constituting an
inducement is. fatal t.the contract.
A moment i thbatht will convince one that in any use of language
approximating. iccuiucy the statement that a promise, induced by a
feeling of moral oligation, is based upon a sufficient consideration, is
absolutely false. "I'5 almit the truth of such a statement is to attack
the whole fotn ation of the doctrine of consideration and introduce
hopeless confusion into the law.
Nevertheless this is the unfortunate state of the law in Pennsylvania
to-day with approving decisions as late as Sutch's Estate, 201 Pa. 305.
'Law of Contract, Anson *p. 74.
2Clark on Contracts, 2d ed., Sec. 61, p. 106.
'Harriman on Contracts, Sec. 91.
4
Sykes vs. Chadwick, 18 Wall 141.
5In Courney vs. Mcfarlane, 97 Pa. 361.
eFitch vs. Suedakes, 38 N. Y. 248.
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This anomalous situation would seem worthy of investigation and review. (Let us undertake it.)
The doctrine of consideration is peculiar to the common law. Its
origin and development are shrouded in obscurity and though it is now
one of our most fundamental conceptions of the contractual elements,
it is doubtless open to question whether the rule works for justice.
The exceptions made in the cases of sealed instruments and the present
class of cases, show clearly that the courts fear the results of an unqualified adoption of the rule. Lord Mansfield as late as 1765 was
impressed with the artificiality of the requirement and thought that
written promises at least should be enforced. He thought the only
utility of the consideration was as circumstantial evidence of the
promise and a writing would certainly be as useful for this purpose. 1
In Pennsylvania the courts profess to require a consideration for all unsealed contracts, but by entering the "cloudland of moral obligation" 2
they have made "the validity of contracts turn upon a series of ethical
problems" "the solution of which lies entirely in the bosom of the individual judge."
Before reviewing the Pennsylvania decisions leading up to the present anomalous rule in Pennsylvania, let us examine the early English
cases which are to blame for starting all the trouble.
In 1767 an action was brought by an apothecary against the overseers of a parish for the cure of a pauper. The pauper boarded with
her son out of the parish, under an agreement made with him by the
defendant Turner, who was the only acting overseer of the parish. The
pauper was suddenly taken ill, and her son called in the plaintiff,
who attended her for four months, and cured her. After the cure,
Turner was applied to and promised to pay the plaintiff's bill. It was
held, that though there was no precedent request from the overseersyet the promise was good .
.
"for overseers are under a moral
obligation to pirovidefor the poor.""I
In a case6 decided in 1817 a pauper who had his settlement in
parish A, but actually resided in parish B, was given needed medical
attention. The overseer of parish A, asked the surgeon for his bill and
said that it should be paid. It appeared that during the illness of the
pauper he was given a weekly allowance by parish A, and Lord Ellenborough held that by so doing they had admitted that they were bound
to provide for him, and said:-- In this case both the legal and moral
obligation obtain.

.

.

.

The case of Watson vs. Turner (supra)

is decisive on the subject, and 1 have no doubt that the plaintiff is en1
Pillans
2

vs. Van Mierop, 3 Burr 1664.
Anson on Contracts, p. 104.
3Anson on Contracts, p. 104.
4
Watson vs. Turner, et. al., Bull. Nisi Prius,129.
5King vs. Mill, 1 Barnwell and Ala. 104.
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titled to recover."
Bayley. J., said that the defendant by asking for
the bill had acknowledged that the medical attention had been "at the
defendant's wish, and upon his responsibility." He added that since
parish A was bound to maintain the pauper "the promise made after the
pauper's death is founded on a legal as well as a moral consideration, and
therefore affords a good ground of action."
Now the decision in the first of the above cases is, on the face of
it, placed on the ground that a moral obligation is consideration for an
express promise; but it has since been stated on high authority.' that
the true ground on which the decision is to be supported is that suggested by Bayley in the second case, viz: that the promise "was evidence from which it might be inferred that the consideration was performed by the plaintiff with the consent of the defendants, and at their
request." The action then is not on the promise itself, but the'promise
is a substitute for a request, and the obligation is by this fiction of a
request carried back to the time the service was rendered. 2 The ground
of action is the promise implied by law to pay for services rendered on
request.
In a later English case8 the liability of parish A, above, is held
to have existed independently of the overseer's promise. The giving of
the allowance is held to be sufficient ground upon which to rest an
implication of a request that any other necessary expenditures be made,
and a promise to repay in cage they should be made.
Notwithstanding the unsatisfactory character of these cases, the
first of them was cited by Lord Ellenborough in Atkins vs. Banwell,
2 East 5b5, for the doctrine that while the law would not imply a
promise to perform a moral obligation, yet the moral obligation would
serve as a consideration to support an actual promise, made after the
service was rendered.
In 1775 an attenipt 4 was made to recover a legacy in a common
law court by an action of assumpsit against the executor. Now the
executor had expressly promised the plaintiff to pay him, and since it
appeared that .there were sufficient assets for him to do so, the legacy
could have been collected in the probate court without the promise; but,
it was urged, now that he had promised, this liability in the probate
court would serve as a "consideration" for the promise. Lord Mansfield said :--" In this case the promise is grounded upon a reasonable
and conscientious consideation, namely, that the defendant had assets
to discharge the legacy. If so, he was compellable in a court of equity,
or in the ecclesiastical court, to pay it. I give my opinion upon this

11 Selwyn's Nisi Prius,p. 51, u 11, and Anson on Contracts, p. 102.
2

Langdell's Summary, p. 93.

sPrynter vs. Williams, 1 C. and M. 810.
4
Atkins and Wife vs. Hill, Cowper 284.
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case as it stands; that is, that it is an express promise made upon a
In another part he said:-' It is
good and sufficient consideration."
the case of a promise made upon a good and valuable consideration,
which in all cases is a sufficient ground to support an action. It is so
in cases of obligations which would otherwise only bind a man's conscience,
and which, without such iromise, he could not be compelled to lay." His
idea seems to be that when a moral obligation is supplemented by an
express promise, it becomes enforceable; or in other words, that a promise to do what one ought to do is enforceable without consideration.
The only illustration of the doctrine given by Mansfield is the case
of an infant who contracts debts during his minority and after he comes
of age consents to pay them. Now the doctrine that an infant may
ratify his contract when he comes of age, was recognized long before
Lord Mansfield's day. In a case' of this kind decided in 1586 it was
said, "And it was holden by the court that although here was no fresent consideration upon which the assumpsit could arise, yet the court
was clear that upon the whole -matter the action did lie." But the
reason for the decision does not appear. It would seem hardly to have
been reached on the ground of moral obligation, for it is said in the
same case that had afeme covert made such a promise and after the death
of her husband had renewed it, she would not have been bound; whereas
the moral obligation would seem to be the same in both cases. The
idea was however expressed by Bayley, J., in a later case 2 where he
says,-" If he makes a promise after he comes of age, that binds him, on
the ground of his taking on himself a new liability, upbon a moral obliIf then the true ground for enforcing an
gation existing before."
infant's ratified contract is that of "moral consideration, " the principle is as ancient as English law. 3 The origin of the conception or at
least of the expression, " moral consideration," is however, generally
attributed to Lord Mansfield. 4 It was undoubtedly he who by dicta
in later cases gave the idea prevalence.
The cases already mentioned are the only English precedents to be
found in the books before 1776 which can with any show of reason be
attributed to the idea of moral obligation as the ratio decidendi.
Let us then note the progress of the English decisions following
1776.
In 1777 an important case 5 was decided. A debtor, who had been
relieved of a debt by a diseharge in bankruptcy, made a new promise
to his creditor to pay part of his debt. In an action on this promise

"Edmunds' case, 3 Leonard, 164, and in Godb, 138.
2Thornton vs. Illingworth, 2 B. and C., 826 (1822.)
8
See Article in 5 Law Times, 439 and 541.
4Sel. Nisi Prius,10th ed. p. 51.
5
Trueman vs. Fenton, Cowper 544.
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the defence was the absence of consideration. Lord Mansfield said,
"All the debts of a bankrupt are due in conscience, notwithstanding he has obtained his certificate, and there is no honest man who
does not discharge them if he afterwards has it in his power to do so.
Though all legal remedy may be gone, the debts are clearly not extinguished in conscience. How far have the courts of equity gone upon
these principles? Where a man devises his estate for payment of his
debts, a court of equity says (and a court of law in a case properly
before them would say the same) : all debts barred by the statute of
limitations shall come in and share the benefit of the devise, because
they are due in conscience. Therefore, though barred by law, they
shall be held to be revived and charged by the bequest." He then
repeated his old illustration of an infant's promise after minority to pay
for goods received during infancy, and finally held the case at bar to be
governed by this principle.
In 1872 another suit' was brought by a legatee against an executrix on her promise to pay a legacy. As in Atkins vs. Hill (supra)
there appeared to be sufficient assets to pay the legacy. Lord Mansfield after deciding that the question of consideration was the only
point in the case, said:-" As to that point, the rule laid down at the
bar, as to what is or is not a good consideration in law, goes upon a
very narrow ground indeed ; namely, that to make a consideration to
support an assumpsit, there must be either an immediate benefit to the
party promising, or a loss to the person to whom the promise was made.
I cannot agree to that being the only ground of consideration sufficient
to raise an assumpsit. Where a man is under a legal or equitable obligation to pay, the law implies a promise, though none was ever
actually made. Aforliori, a legal or equitable duty is a sufficient conWhere a man is under a moral oblisideration for an actual promise.
gation, which no court of law or equity can enforce, and promises, the
honesty and rectitude of the thing is a consideration." He then gave the

same illustrations mentioned in the preceding case; viz., those of
bankruptcy, infancy and the statute of limitations; and then proceeded:-" In such and many other instances, though the promise gives
a compulsory remedy where there was none before either in law or
equity, yet as the promise is only to do what an honest man ought to
do, the ties of conscience upon an upright mind are a sufficient considera-

tion.

But an executor who has received assets is under every kind of

obligation to pay a legacy .

. .

. The legacy in such a case is a demand

clearly due from the executor upon various grounds of natural and
civil justice, and may be recovered from him by process of law. In
such a case a promise to pay stands upon the strongest consideration."

IHawkes

et ux. vs. Saunders, Cowper, 289.
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Justice Buller wrote a concurring opinion in the same case and
said in part :-" I shall give my opinion singly on this point; whether
an obligation in justice, equity and conscience to pay a sum of money,
be or be not a sufficient consideration in point of law to support a
promise to pay that sum. If such a question were stripped of all
authorities, it would be resolved by inquiring whether law were a rule
of justice or whether it were something that acts in direct contradiction
to justice, conscience and equity."
And later:-"The true rule is
that wherever a defendant is under a moral obligation, or is liable in
conscience and equity to pay, that is a sufficient consideration."
The decisions in these two cases of suits against executors, viz.:
Atkins vs. Hill and Hawkes vs. Saunders, in which Lord Mansfield
took occasion to express his views so fully on the question of moral
obligations; have both since been overruled in England in Weeks vs.
Strutt, 5 T. R. 690.
In 1804 Cooper vs. Martin-, 4 East 76, was decided by Lord Ellenborough. The case was one of a promise to pay for necessaries furnished one during infancy, the promise having been made after the defendant became of age. Nothing was said about moral obligation but
this case is seized upon as a foundation for the leading Pennsylvania case
on the subject.
The same year there appeared the famous note to Wennall vs.
Adney1 written by the reporters Bosanquet and Puller. It was pointed
out by them that Lord Mansfield had given only three illustrations for
his very broad statements as to moral obligations, viz., those growing
out of infancy, bankruptcy, and the statute of limitations. In all these
cases the defendant is promising to pay for a benefit actually received.
Now, it was suggested that in such cases one is under such an "imperative duty" to repay, that he would be compelled by law to do so were it
not for the special interference of the rule as to infancy and the statutes
of bankruptcy and limitations. It was urged that the expression
"moral obligation" be limited to these cases where there is "some
piositive rule, which, with a view to general benefit, exempts the party
in that particular instance from legal liability," and that the promise
be regarded as operating to " rbvive" the old liability. It was noted
that a father is under a sort of moral obligation to support his children, but that such duties are of" too vague and undefined" a sort to
be called a consideration for a promise to the child to provide for such
support or for a promise to pay a third person who has voluntarily temporarily fulfilled the parental function. But,where the detriment had beensuffered at the request of the parent, then the debt is
clearly the parents. " Indeed," it was said, "if any of the cases

1 3 B, and P., 249.

8
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could be sustained on the principle that a father is, by the mere force
of moral obligation, bound to pay what has been advanced to his son,
because he has subsequently promised to pay it, by the same rule the
son should be liable for the debt of the father upon a simple promise;
for the same obligation exists in both cases."
The distinction was also drawn between contracts void and those
merely voidable, e. g., those of married women were compared with
those of an infant, and it was held, that while the same moral obligation would be imposed on both to pay for a benefit received during
disability, yet that the subsequent express promise of one made after
would create a legal obligation, whereas
the removal of the disability
1
the other would not.
In 18o9 Barnes vs. Hedley, 2 a case often cited on this point, was
decided. A had lent B money at usurious interest. But as he feared
the loss of his whole debt because of the usury, he made an estimate
of the amount due at lawful interest, giving credit for past excessive
payments. The old debt was cancelled and a promise was made to pay
the new sum found due. Without any discussion of principles this
new promise was held enforceable. No notice was taken of the note
to Wennall vs. Adney, but it would seem that the case might be
brought within the rule of the note, if the.,statute against usury be
regarded as such an one as those of bankruptcy and limitations. The
promisor has personally received a benefit in the original loan.
In 1813 Lee vs. Muggeridge3 was decided. A's son was in embarrassed circumstances and wanted to borrow money from B. To
induce the loan, A proposed to become security to the extent of /'2,ooo,
by a bond payable at her death. B relied on this undertaking of A,
and made the loan, though A was at the time a married woman. After
her husband's death, A expressly promised that her executors should
pay the bond. On the question as to the consideration for this later
promise Lord Mansfield said:--" It has been long established that
where a person is bound morally and conscientiously to pay a debt,
though not legally bound, a subsequent promise to pay will give a
a right of action." He thus repudiated the distinction between
',void'" and "voidable" promises made in the note to Wennall vs.
Adney and also the principle that the promisor must have received a
benefit personally in the first instance. He made no reference to the
note, though it was written nine years before. The only new illustration given is that of the debtor, who renews his promise to pay a debt
originally not collectible because of usury in the first contract.

'Citing Lloyd vs. Lee, 1 Str. 94, and Cockshott vs. Bennett, 2 T. R. 763.
22 Taunton 184.
95 Taunton 36.
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Three other judges wrote concurring opinions. Gibbs, J., said:"It cannot, I think, be disputed now, that whenever there is a moral
obligation to pay a debt, or perform a duty, a promise to perform that
duty, or pay that debt, will be supported by the previous moral obligation." He then proceeded to repudiate the suggestion of the defendant's counsel that this doctrine be restricted in its application to cases
where there had been at some time or other a legal obligation which
had been discharged by some other means than payment, e.g., by lapse
of time or bankruptcy. He pointed out that in Barnes vs. Hedley
there never was a legal obligation to repay since the usury rendered
the contract void ab initio.
Heath, J., said:-" The notion that a promise may be supported
by a moral obligation is not modern; in Charles the Second's time it
was said, 'if there be an iota of equity, it is enough consideration for
the promise.'"
In 1831 a case' arose for decision by one of Lord Mansfield's successors and already the stand taken by all three judges in Lee vs.
Muggeridge was questioned. A married woman had been furnished
necessaries and after her husband's death had expressly promised to
pay for them. Though it was recognized that the husband is primarily
liable for necessaries furnished the wife during coverture, yet, as she
was living apart from her husband at the time, it was contended that
she was under a moral obligation to pay for them, and that this would
serve as a consideration for her later promise.
Lord Tenterden, while placing his decision on a defect in the
pleading, took occasion to remark that "the doctrine that a moral
obligation is a sufficient consideration for a subsequent promise is one
which should be received with some limitation."
In 184o Eastwood vs. Kenyon 2 was decided. This case is now
recognized as the ruling case in England to-day on this subject. A
guardian, in managing the estate of his infant ward, expended money
on his ward's estate in excess of the income from it. When the ward
came of age she promised to repay him. The ward then married and
her husband, in view of the benefit he individually received from his
wife, also promised to pay the guardian, who had settled his final account
and so had no way to recover his advances. The guardian brought
suit against the husband on this promise.
Lord Denman expressly repudiated the broad ground taken by
Lord Mansfield in Lee vs. Muggeridge and held that the only cases
in which a moral obligation should be recognized as a substitute for a
consideration are those in which the promise can operate to " revive a
precedent good consideration, which might have been enforced at law
ifEittlefield vs. Shee, 2 Barn. and Ad. 811.
211 Adol. and 11.
438.

IO
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through the medium of an implied promise, had it not been suspended
by some positive rule of law." Therefore, the promise should "give
no original cause of action, if the obligation, on which it was founded,
never could have been enforced at law, though not barred by any legal
maxim or statute provision." Thus, at last, the doctrine of the note
to Wennall vs. Adney was adopted in almost the very words used by
the reporters. The court thought that a woman's new promise after
coverture would not come within this rule, but her case would seem to
be closely analogous to that of an infant's new promise after majority.
True, it is said that her promise is void in the first instance, while an
infant's is merely voidable, but since neither's promise is malum in se
or malum pirohibitum, and the sante moral obligation exists in both
cases, the force of the distinction is not obvious. In both cases we
have a benefit received at request under circumstances from which a
,promise would have been implied but for the disability to make a
promise, imposed temporarily by the law. The fact that a borrower at
a usurious rate is bound by a later promise shows that not all cases where
the original promise was void are rejected. Of course a distinction can
be made between cases where the benefit is received involuntarily as in
Eastwood vs. Kenyon, and those in which the loan is secured at the
request of the promisor as in Lee vs. Muggeridge and Barnes vs. Hedley,
but this distinctinction would apply equally to cases of infants and
married women.
Important as has been the effect of the decision of Eastwood vs.
Kenyon, one searches in vain in it for any satisfactory defence of the
requirement of a consideration generally or for any satisfactory objection to the moral oblgation substitute. True, Lord Denman says that
"just debts " should be preferred to voluntary undertakings, but how
is this an objection to compelling a rich man without debts, to pay
what he ought in morals to pay and has promised to pay? He also
says that Lord Manfield's doctrine " would annihilate the necessity for
any consideration at all, inasmuch as the mere fact of giving a promise creates a moral obligation to perform it." But this remark, as has
been since pointed out,' is more specious than sound, for there is a
clear distinction between a promise in pursuance of an existing moral
duty and a promise purely gratuitous when made, and itself creating
the only moral duty that exists to perform it. True, one should not
raise expectations in any case unless he intends fulfillment, but is it not
distinctly more reprehensible (because of the greater likelihood of
reliance on the promise) for one, to promise what the promisee has a
moral right to expect, than to promise a pure piece of beneficence ?

'By McIver, J., in Ferguson vs. Harris, 39 S. C., 323, 17 S. E. 782.
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In this connection it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania were so far from being impressed by the force of Lord
Denman's remark that they have actually decided' that when one
makes one promise, and has thus created the duty to do the act promised, while this promise may be unenforceable as without'consideration,
yet, if, in pursuance of this now existing moral duty, he makes a
second promise to do the act formerly promised, an action may be
brought on this second promise, and the moral obligation will serve
as a sufficient consideration.
The idea that a promise once repeated is as enforceable as a promise under seal, is a novel one, and that the courts would recognize
repetition as well as formality as a substitute for a consideration in all
cases is hardly to be believed. The idea was expressed by Green, J.,
in the following language:--" If it be granted that the agreement to
give the due bill imposed no legal obligation, how can it be denied
that it created at least a moral obligation to do so? The duty to Perform
a positive promise, which is not contrary to law or to.public policy, or
obtained by fraud, imposition, undue influence or mistake, is certainly
an obligation in morals, and if so, it is a suficient consideration for
an express Promise."
The case was really one in which the moral obligation seems to
have had a more substantial foundation than that indicated. The
female plaintiff had spent twenty-three years in the faithful service of
the defendant as a sales-lady at a rate of compensation which the
defendant recognized as an inadequate reward for her faithfulness.
This case was severely criticised 2 as soon as decided. The first
promise seems to have been but an outburst of generosity toward, it is
true, a meritorious object. "The equities of the case were," as Mr.
Ewell says, "clearly with the plaintiff, and one cannot regret that the
decision was in her favor," but for the judges to manufacture such a
curious doctrine as that expressed, was to go " farther than the English or Ametican authorities will support them ; or to state our opinion more clearly, it seems to us that this doctrine can find no valid
support in the common law." 3
In 1846 a case 4 of a quite different character arose in England.
The case is illustrative of that large class of cases in which the moral
obligation arises from-a duty to indemnify for a wrong done the promisee by the promisor.
A had seduced B and procured her cohabitation with him as his
mistress for a long time. Later they decided to separate and A, appre'Bentley et al., Executors, vs. Lamb, 112 Pa. 484.
2By Ewell in 25 Am. Law Reg. 635.
'Idem.

4Beaumont vs. Reeve, 8 Q. B. 483.
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ciating that B, because of her loss of reputation, would have difficulty
in making an honest living, promised to pay B an annuity of ;66o per
annum to compensate for the injury done. B was compelled to sue on
this promise.
Lord Denman adopted the doctrine ot the note to Wennall vs.
Adney, as approved in Eastwood vs. Kenyon, and stated the rule to be
that " an express promise cannot be supported by a consideration
from which the law could not imply a promise, except where the
express promise does away with a legal suspension or bar of a right
of action which, but for such suspension, or bar, would be valid."
The judges agreed that if the obligation is such that the law would
enforce it without a promise, an action might be brought on the promise
if one is actually made, but that a " precedent moral obligation, not
capable of creating an original cause of action, will not support an
express promise."
Under the rule of the note to Wennall vs. Adney this decision, is
clearly correct, for the rule of law forbidding one to recover for a
wrong to which he has consented, which is the obstacle to a recovery
by a seducee against her seducer, is a fundamental doctrine of the
common law and could not be classed as one of the " positive rules,
which, with a view to the general benefit, exempt a party in a particular instance from legal liability." The effect of the rule is rather to
determine that seduction is no tort as to the seducee.
In 1821 in Binnington vs. Wallis' it had been decided that the
loss of reputation by a woman from long continued cohabitation with
one not her husband would not support an express promise to pay an
annuity as reparation for the injury. No seduction was alleged and
a dictum in the opinion would indicate that had this element been
present the result might have been different. But the later case ot
Beaumont vs. Reeve (supra) decided that even the presence of seduction will not warrant a recovery.
In Pennsylvania there are two decisions in cases of this kind. In
Shenk vs. Mingle, 2 decided in 1825, Judge Duncan expressed the
opinion that a "man who has thus humbled an honest woman, if he
will not marry her, is in honor and conscience bound to make some
provision for her " and added, " God forbid, where a man is bound in
honor and conscience, that a court of law should say the contrary."
. " Where a party is under a moral obligation to do a thing, a
...
promise made to do it will not be considered a nudum faclum, though
no other consideration appears." The Court considered the note to
Wennall vs. Adney, but did not express his approval of it. He added,

14 Barnewall and Alderson, 650.
213 Serg. and R. 29.
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however, that in any event the plaintiff's release of what she might have
recovered in a criminal proceeding was a sufficient pecuniary consideration to support the promise. The above statements, therefore, may
be regarded as dicta.
In Wyant vs. Lesher,' decided in 1854, Justice Woodward said:"Past cohabitation has always been held sufficient to support a settlement or an agreement to pay money."
He, however, regarded the
compromise of the criminal prosecution for bastardy as constituting the
consideration, rather than the moral obligation.
In so far as these cases rest upon the doctrine that a moral obligation is a consideration they are outside the pale of'the note to Wennall
vs. Adney and give color to such sweeping statements as those made
by Justice Mitchell. The defendant before his promise was not protected from liability by some positive rule of law. The promise is not
a waiver of such protection as in infancy, bankruptcy and the statute
of limitations, nor does it revive an old liability as in the two latter
cases mentioned. The cases must rest on moral obligation in its broadest sense.
Let us now examine the Pennsylvania cases systematically, that
we may discover whether the rule is without any limitation in Pennsylvania, or, if there are limitations, to discover what they are.
In Greeves vs. McAllister 2 A expended money in a matter necessary for his own protection and from purely selfish motives. He later
called B's attention to the fact that B had incidently shared in the
benefit resulting from the expenditure. Though B was ignorant of
the fact that the expenditure had been made and the benefit A had
conferred was conferred involuntarily by him, nevertheless B promised
A to contribute part of the expenditure. In a suit on this promise,
Rush, J., said:--" Though the service has been rendered prior to the,
promise, yet if the party be under either a legal or a moral oblizgalion
to pay, the promise wilf bind him."
For precedents he relied on
Watson vs. Turner, the case of past medical attention to the pauper;
Scott vs. Wilson, 3 case in which a father promised to pay for past unsolicited nursing of his child, and Cooper vs. Martin, 4 a case in which
one promised to pay for necessaries supplied to him in infancy.
The moral obligation in the first two of these cases is clearly not
within the note to Wennall vs. Adney. In fact the very illustration used
in the note of a moral obligation "too vague and undefined" to be called a
consideration, was that of the obligation growing out of the parental
relationship. By approving Scott vs. Wilson, therefore, the court em123 Pa. 338.
22 Binney 591 (1805).
34 Geo. IV. Ness. 1 £sp. Dig. 189.
44 East 76.
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phatically repudiated the limitations to the rule suggested by the note
to Wennall vs. Adney, and proclaimed the doctrine that a "transient
feeling of gratitude"' will serve as a substitute for a consideration.
Clark vs. Herring 2 was a suit against an executor on his promise
to pay a legacy. Tilghman, C. J., adopted Lord Mansfield's theory of
moral obligation as enunciated in the parallel case of Atkins vs. Hill,
supra, and sustained a judgment against the defendant de bonis fropriis.
The moral obligation in these cases is said to arise from the possession
of assets destined for the plaintiff. But such a promise, if merely
verbal, is uninforceable because within the statute of frauds.' 4
In Hassinger vs. Solms' A was .endorser on a note, and the financial condition of the maker indicated that A would be compelled to
pay part of the note at least. B in direct opposition to A's expressed
desire, induced the maker to pay part of the note and B then guaranteed the payment of the balance. A was thus released from his obligation as indorser and moved by gratitude to B, he promised to indemnify him against loss on his guaranty. In suit on this promise B recovered. Gibson, J., declared that, " a moral obligation is a sufficient
consideration for an express promise," and Duncan, J., said that " the
ties of conscience on an uprighl man, are a sufficient consideration ;" and
later, "However this doctrine may have been shaken in England, I
consider it as adopted in Pennsylvania to the extent of such consideration supporting an express promise."
In Willing vs. Peters 6 a debtor upon payment of sixty per cent. of
his debts received releases from his creditQrs. Later he promised to pay
the plaintiff the amount yet unpaid. It was held that the moral duty
to pay in full would support the promise. A strong argument was
made before the court to induce the adoption of the rule of the note
to Wennall vs. Adney, but the court was unconvinced. It had been
urged that before the making of the promise, the balance due was not
uncollectible because of any "statute or positi;re rule of law," but
simply because of the creditor's voluntary act; but the court rejected
the distinction and held the moral duty to pay sufficient consideration,
not only where the discharge is under the bankrupt law, but also where
it is secured by a release from the creditors.
In Baeder vs. Barton," a parallel case, Mr. John G. Johnson
renewed the attack on the same lines. The court conceded that,
'Compare Mills vs. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207.
25 Binney 33, (1812).
3
Okeson's Appeal, 59 Pa. 99 and Act of Apr. 26, 1855.
4Burt vs. Herron, 66 Pa. 404 and Smith vs. Carroll, 112 Pa. 390.
55 Serg. and R. 4 (1818).
612 Serg. and R. 177 (1824).
711 W. N. C. 165 (1881),
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"Were this a new question, it would admit of serious doubt," but
refused to overrule Willing vs. Peters.
In Snevily vs. Reed, I a curious ground of distinction was taken.
This distinction is sometimes overlooked and Snevily vs. Reed has been
cited as overruling Willing vs. Peters. Sergeant, J., did approve the
distinction urged and rejected in Willing vs. Peters, viz., between discharges secured in the face of the creditor's opposition by means of
bankruptcy proceedings and those resulting from a voluntary release.
But the theory on which he conceived even the moral duty to pay to
have been extinguished was, that, since the creditor had arrested the
debtor on a ca. sa., though he almost immediately released him again,
he had secured full satisfaction of his claim. Having secured the imprisonment of the debtor, the creditor had received" the highest price."
In Callahan vs. Ackley, 2 this distinction was overlooked. Briggs, J.,
held that where a creditor, having received fifty per cent. of his claim,
joins in a composition release of all claims, a note later given to him
for the balance of his claim is not enforceable. The moral obligation
was extinguished, he thought, because the plaintiff had consented to
the discharge. The release involved a gift of the balance due, and
gratitude for a gift will not convert a promise of a like gift into a contract. As has been shown, this ingenious distinction was later rejected
in Baeder vs. Barton, (supra).
In Levy vs. Cadet, el. al.,3 the question first arose as to the enforceableness of a new promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of
limitations, and it was held that the effect of the statute is to bar the
"The debt remains as obligaremedy and not to extinguish the debt.
tory inforo conscientiae after the expiration of the six years as before."
The new promise rests on this moral obligation for a consideration and
the action should in principle, therefore, be brought on the new promise. The plaintiff was allowed, however, to declare on the original
cause of action. In Yaw vs. Kerr, 4 an attempt was made to take
advantage of this supposed error in the pleadings, but Woodward, C.
J., said:--" However good the logic of this argument, it has long since
been rejected as law in Pennsylvania. With us the action is always
brought upon the original undertaking, and when the statute is pleaded
the new promise is proved, not to raise a cause of action but to show
that the legal objection to the old promise has been waived." The
question as to the consideration for the new promise thus becomes
unimportant in these cases, for it is not sued upon.

Watts 396 (1840).
Phila..99 (1873) and 30 I4 eg. Int. 12.
317 Seg. and R. 126.
447 Pa. 333 (1864).
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In Woods vs. Irwin' an executrix confessed a judgment in favor
of a creditor whose debt was barred by the statute. Other creditors
objected. It was held that the moral duty to pay the debt would have
justified the decedent in even making such a creditor a preferred creditor, and if so, it certainly justified his representatives in converting the
moral duty into a legal debt.
Inasmuch as the new promise is only used as a waiver of the
right to plead the statute, a distinct and unequivocal acknowledgment
of the debt is all that is required, for a promise will then be inferred. 2
In Field's Estate 3 we have the earliest discussion of the status of
a promise made to pay a debt discharged by a certificate of bankruptcy.
Gibson, C. J., said:-"I am at a loss to imagine how the opinion came
to be adopted, that a debt discharged by a certificate of bankruptcy is
a valid consideration for a promise."
He then expressed ihe opinion
that in every sale on credit the seller insures himself against possible
loss through the bankruptcy of the buyer, by enhancing the price of the
goods. When then he is called upon to bear this loss the possibility of
which he had contemplated and provided against, " he cannot, even
in conscience, object to bearing the loss."
He admits that this would
not apply to a loan made gratuitously. But in any case to allow the
bankrupt to revive his old debts is to do an injustice to his new creditors who have given him credit on the faith of his discharge from his
old debts.
Justice Gibson, however, felt constrained to follow the English
precedents, and allowed a recovery on the new promise. The fact that
the old debt was a specialty did not entitle the creditors to have the
new promise treated as a specialty, as would have been the case if the
new promise were treated merely as a waiver, as in the case of debts
barred by the statute of limitations. Thd decision, therefore, can only
be supported on the ground of moral obligation. The debt is "absolutely extinguished, ' 4 and since an acknowledgment of a debt which
no longer exits can create no liability, the theory of a promise implied
from an acknowledgment is rejected in these cases and a " clear, distinct and unequivocal promise " is demanded, and the promise must
clearly identify the debt. 6 Likewise in these cases the declaration
7
must be on the new promise and not on the original debt.

1141 Pa. 278.
2

Bolton vs. King, 105 Pa. 78 (1884).
32 Rawle 351.
4Bolton vs. King, 105 Pa. 78, and Murphyvs. Crawford, 114 Pa. 496 (1886).
5
Hazelton's Estate, 1 W. N. C. 67 and Hobough vs. Murphy, 114 Pa. 358.
rHobough, Assignee, vs. Murphy, 114 Pa. 358.

7Field's Estate, 2 Rawle 351, Ott vs. Perry, 1 Phila. 79 and Murphy vs.
Crawford, 114 Pa. 496.
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The position of the Pennsylvania courts in these cases is peculiar,
to say the least. Lord Mansfield had allowed a recovery in a like case
on the theory that "where a remedy is taken away, and not the debt,
the debt is a debt in conscience, and may be the ground of a future
promise or security."
But in Pennsylvania the courts insist that the
discharge in bankruptcy does not bar the remedy merely but completely extinguishes the debt. Both parties, however, recognize the
new promise as supported by a moral obligation, so that the position
of the Pennsylvania courts is simply a quibble over words.
In Earnest vs. Parke1 it is pointed out that "the discharge of an insolvent under the insolvent laws differs from a certificate in bankruptcy,
in that the debtor still owes the money not only in honesty and in
good conscience but in law also. His person simply is exempted from
arrest. "
Rogers, J., in the same case states that the idea, that by a new
promise a debt barred by the statue-of limitations is revived, had been
"exploded," and that "in effecting this change the courts of this state
have taken a distinguished part." Thirty years later, however, we
find that Justice Woodward has overlooked the " explosion" and has
2
decided to follow the old idea.
Another illustration of that class of cases in which there has at
one time been a valid legal obligation which has since become inoperative because of a "positive rule of law," is the case of a trustee whose
accounts have been audited and approved by the judgment of a court,
and who himself has been discharged. The doctrine of res adjudicata
exempts the trustee in guch a case from further liability, just as do
the statutes of limitation and bankruptcy in the cases we have been
considering. It sometimes occurs, however, as in Stebbins vs. County
of Crawford, 3 that an error is made in the accounts and overlooked
by the auditors. If then the trustee expressly promises to make up
the deficiency, can the promise be enforced ? Cases of this class clearly
come within the rule of the note to Wennall vs. Adney and the Court
correctly held that the moral obligation to pay was a sufficient considerration to support the promise to do so.
In Anderson vs. Best, 4 instead of an obligation once binding but
now barred by a rule of law, we have the case of a promise to recognize an obligation which from the beginning was barred by a statute.
A sells land to B, but before making a deed, resells it to C at a large
advance. The statute of frauds protects A from an action for his

14 Rawle 452 (1834), followed in Thomas vs. Hodgson, 4 Wharton 492,

2

Yaw vs. Kerr, 47 Pa. 333 (1864).
392 Pa. 289.
4176 Pa. 498.
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breach of contract, but his sense of duty impels him to promise to pay
B $r,OOO damages. This promise A puts in writing, so that the only
objection is the want of consideration. In Anderson vs. Best it was
held that the first promise (the promise to sell) created a moral duty
to keep it and that the second promise (the promise to pay the $i,ooo),
was supported by the moral obligation to repair the damage resulting
from his failure to perform this moral duty. This is not quite the same
as saying that whereas one promise may be unenforceable for want of consideration, a repetition of that promise will not be so since it (the second promise) can rest on the moral duty to perform the earlier promise. 1 The only difference, however, is that in Anderson vs. Best, the
first promise was bad for want of proper form rather than for want of
consideration; and the second promise was to pay for not keeping the
first one rather than a renewal of the original promise. Both cases
seem to be pretty far up in the "cloudland of moral obligation," as
Mr. Anson would say.
It will be remembered that the authors of the note to Wennell
vs. Adney were of the opinion that, whereas an infant, who receives
benefits under a contract voidable because of his infancy, should be
allowed to ratify that contract after reaching his majority; a married woman, who receives benefits under a contract void because of
her coverture, should not be required to keep a promise to pay for
those benefits, even though such promise were made after the woman
had become a widow. The married woman's contract, they said, is
"absolutely void," whereas that of the infant is "only voidable."
Approaching the question from the standpoint of moral obligation the
distinction between the two cases is hard to see. The Pennsylvania
courts refuse to make a distinction.
In Murray vs. Kelly 2 the woman was protected from action both
by the statute of limitations and by.the fact that she incurred the debt
while married. A promise to pay, made by her after she became discovert, was nevertheless recognized as sufficient to render her liable,
and the decision was placed on the moral obligation ground.
In Hemphill vs McClimans 8 , the original promise of the woman
had been to pay for services to be rendered to her son. The services
were rendered in reliance on the promise, so that the detriment to
the promisee furnished the consideration. No moral obligation can be
said to arise, however, from the receipt of a benefit by the woman. It
must arise, if at all, from the violation of the duty not to create false
hopes or inspire groundless expectations.
After securing a divorce the woman repeated her promise and it was
'Bentley el al. Executors vs. Lamb, 112 Pa. 484.
22 Lack. Jur. 181.
324 Pa. 367 (1855).
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held to constitute a contract supported by the moral obligation. In
his opinion Black, J., said :-"The law may saywhat it will about void
and voidable contracts, but there is no code of ethics which says that
the duty of not abusing the confidence of one who has honestly served
you, is a void obligation upon the conscience. This is not a question
to be settled by metaphysics. All judicial casuistry upon such subjects
must be pernicious. We would be very sorry to tell the defendant
that the sense of justice that impelled her to promise justice was all a
He'then expressed his admiration for "the plain rule,
mistake."
which says that a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration for a
direct promise," and added, "and we affirm this to be a moral obligation,
because the common sense of all mankind affirms that it cannot be
violated without moral guilt."
This "plain rule," laid down by justice Black, was not long in
embarrassing the Supreme Court by its sweeping character. In a few
years we find Justice Woodward, in Paul vs. Stackhouse', calling the
case a "mischievous precedent" and saying, "A moral obligation, no
doubt, there was to pay for labor which she had induced others to expend for the benefit of her son, but like most moral obligations, it was
enforceable, inforo conscientiaerather than in a court of law
But the work having been finished at Mrs. Hemphill's instance, her
subsequent promise, when she became able to contract, should hzve been
coupled with the precedent request, and thus a valid consideration, though
past and bygone, would have been found."
Justice Woodward's attempt to support the decision, while he rejects the ground adopted by the court, is more ingenious than sound.
True, the law will imply a promise to pay for services rendered on request unless the dircumstances indicate that one is simply asking a
favor. But even if a promise to pay were implied it would be void be-&
cause of the promisor's coverture. And why imply a promise when
an express one is proved? If then, the duty to leep the original
promise (whether the express one or that implied from the request)
will not support the later promise, as Justice Woodward contends, how
can the bare request do so, when the request is important only as the
ground for implying a promise?
The idea that a request can be coupled with a later promisg and
so render intervening services available as a consideration for the
promise, must be limited to those cases in which the promise is contemplated from the beginning, as where the exact price to be paid is
left to future agreement. The promise is then supported by a present
consideration, viz:, the compromise as to the amount of the unliquidated claim. 2
138 Pa. 302.
2

See Huffent's Anson*p. 100.
Ir. C. L. 468.

Discussion of Lampleigh vs. Braithwait, 8
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In Leanord vs. Duffin' a curious extention of the rule in Hemphill vs. McClimans is made. A had a claim against B, a married
woman, for money loaned to her. Of course it was not collectible.
Two of B's children, however, confess a judgment for the amount of
the claim but later defend on the ground of want of consideration.
Justice Murcer declared the "equity of the claim" to be a sufficient
consideration to support the children's promise, and then indulged in
this curious logic :-"If the indebtedness of a married woman is a
sufficient consideration to support a iromise made by her after the
coverture is removed, we cannot see why it may not support the promise
of a third party." In other words, if a benefit to A imposes a moral
obligation upon A to pay for it, this benefit to A must also impose a
like duty on B to pay for it. The absurdity is manifest. The only
obligation resting on the children must grow out of a duty to pay their
parents' debts. To hold that there is a moral obligation resting on
every child to pay his parents' debts, sufficiently strong to support a
promise, seems to be going pretty far, and yet if the case can be supported it must be on this ground. Several cases hold that a widow is
2
not per se under any such obligation to pay her husband's debts. Of
course if a widow of a solvent husband prefers to give her note rather
than settle the estate of her husband and pay his debts out of the estate,
she cannot complain that such a note is enforced. She gets a consideration in the undisturbed enjoyment of the estate and in the forbearance
of the creditor. 8
In another case 4 it is held that there is no moral obligation resting on a parent to pay his son's debts or to repair his wrongs, such as
will support his promise to do so. A father had given his note to the
employer of his son for a sum which the son had stolen from his employer, and it was held that the note could not be collected for want of
consideration. Leondrd vs. Duffin would seem then to be a judicial
mistake, whether viewed from the standpoint of reason or precedent.
In Brooks vs. Merchants National Bank 5 , a married woman was
sued on a note dated 1888, which had been given in renewal of a note
executed before the act of June 3, 1887. Her disability existing before
the passage of this statute rendered the first note void. The one executed after the removal of the disability was therefore given for the
surrender of a worthless paper and was without consideration. This
was the defense made, but the court held that the moral obligation to
pay the first note would be consideration enough to support the second
194 Pa. 218 (1880).
2

3

38.

Bayler vs. Com., 40 Pa. 37.

Paxson vs. Nields, 137 Pa. 385 (1890).

Reiley vs. Dean, 36 Leg. Int. 304, and Kircher vs. Sprenger, 4 Super. Ct.

,Coumney vs. Macfarlane, 97 Pa. 361.
5125 Pa. 394 (1889).
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one. Lyons vs. Burns' involved almost the same facts as Brooks vs.
Bank, and it was similarly decided.
The promise of a widow to repay money borrowed by her while
married, must be the foundation of the action. As in the cases of new
promises after a discharge in bankruptcy, it is the new promise that
must be declared on. Acknowledgments alone may remove the bar of
the statute of limitations, but they will not validate a married woman's
promise. 2
In Holden vs. Banes et al.,3 a wife promised to secure her husband's debts, and induced additional loans by her promises. After her
husband's death she renewed this promise, and it was held that the
moral obligation to keep the first promise would serve as a consideration to support the second promise.
In Geiselbrecht vs. Geiselbrecht 4 a married woman promised to
repay money loaned. Whether the money went to her husband or
whether she got the benefit of it herself was in doubt. But Potter, J.,
held that in either event "the originalpiromise to Pay the debt creates a
moral obligation which is a sufficient consideration" to support the
later promise. In the same case it appeared that the defendant did not
know that she was not bound by the original promise, when she madg
the second one, but it was held that as she understood the nature of
the paper she was signing (her second promise) and as there was no fraud
or mistake, she would be bound.
In Dennis vs. Grove, a man gave his note for a quantity of fertilizer bought for use on his wife's farm. As she had gotten the benefit his note was later surrendered and her note was given in its stead.
It was held that the receipt of the benefit of the fertilizer imposed on
the wife a moral obligation to pay for it and that this was sufficient to
support her note. It would seem that the detriment to the plaintiffs
in surrendering the husband's note in return for the wife's would have
been consideration enough, and that the use of the moral obligation
doctrine here was unnecessary.
It will be remembered that the editors of the note to Wendell vs.
Adney were of the opinion that the moral duty of a parent to support
his child is of "too vague and undefined" a sort to constitute a consideration for a promise made to the child, or for a promise made to one
who has temporarily supported the child without the parent's request.
Let us see how the family relation is regarded in Pennsylvania.
In Kennedy's Exs. vs. Ware 6 a father made an advancement to
his daughter by assigning to her husband a certain judgment. The
18 Pa. C. C. R. 359, 20 Phila. 412.
2
Kelly vs. Eby. 141 Pa. 176 (1891).
3140 Pa. 63 (1891).
48 Super. Ct. 183 (1898).

54 Super. Ct. 480.
al Pa. 445 (1845).
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father later asked that the judgment be reassigned to him and he
promised to make a conveyance of a lot of land as a substitute. The
judgment was reassigned, but the father then refused to convey the lot.
After the father's death his executors were sued on this promise.
Gibson, C. J., recognized that the assignment was in consideration of
natural love and affection, but this he held to be worthless as a support
for an executory promise, such as was the assignment. Both the
assignment and the reassignment were therefore nullities and there was
no consideration for the promise to convey the land. Had the assignment been an executed gift, ihe result would, of course, have been
otherwise. Consanguinity will carry the use of an executed contract,
but will not sustain an executory one.
In this case Chief Justice Gibson examined the English decisions
and referred to the note to Wennall vs. Adney as a "masterly review of
all the cases," and finally approved of the idea that the doctrine of moral
obligation be limited to those cases where the Promisor has received an
actual benefit but is protected by some stubborn rule of law. The present case is thus ruled out because while "every man is indeed under a
moral obligation to maintain and provide for his offspring, it is an
obligation which springs from the dictates of his nature, not from a
benefit received by the parent, or a prejudice suffered by the child."
This decision has every appearance of adopting the rule of the note
to Wennall vs. Adney. ,That it had greatly restrained the idea of a
moral obligation's being a sufficient consideration in all cases was declared to be the case in Loan Association vs. Stonemetz 1 , but when
Justice Black came to the decision of Hemphill vs. McClimans 2 he laid
down his "plain rule" that a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration for a promise.
In Dennison vs. Goehring 3 a father bought land with his own
money and had himself named as trustee for his children. Later he
tried to retract. Chief Justice Gibson held that this was a trust
declared, and therefore an executed contract, and it could not, therefore,
be defeated by want of consideration. He then proceeded to give expression to the following dictum, which seems to indicate a considerable change of opinion since the decision of Kennedy vs. Ware. He
said :-"Even if we were to take the deed to be, not a conveyance ot
the legal estate in trust, but an executory agreement to create a trust, it
is far from clear that the result would be different. Natural affection,
though not a valuable, is a meritorious consideration; on the foot of
which, an agreement by a father to secure a provision for his child has
been enforced in equity, by reason of the obligation of parents to pro129 Pa. 534 (1857).
224 Pa. 367.
37 la. 175.

MORAL CONSIDERATION IN PENNSYLVANIA
vide for their offspring. Thus in Goring vs. Nash, 3 Alk. 186, a
father's covenant to settle an estate on his son was specifically decreed."
On the other hand it has frequently been held that a consideration
from natural love and affection will not sustain a promissory note.'
That the courts are very ready, however, to sustain such cases on
2
the trust theory is manifest from the case of K. X. v*. A. Y.,et al.,
A father wrote to his illegitimate child stating that he had bought certain premises for her benefit, " to be held in trust by me for these purposes as long as desirable." The letter was delivered to the child's
mother for her. In an action against the lawful heirs of the father,
the letter was held to be a declaration of trust, terminated by the father's death, the child then becoming entitled to hold-the premises in
her own name. The court said:-" What is called the consideration
of love and affection is really the legal recognition of the sense of moral
duty arising out of relationship;granting this relationship, the consideration exists independent of the actual state of feeling between the
parties. It is the obligation of a father to provide for his children."
Justice Gibson's adoption 3 ofthe rule ofthe noteto Wennall vs. Adney
as the Pennsylvania rule was followed by Woodward, J., in Paul vs.
Stackhouse4 , and this double adoption might well have been regarded
as setting the Pennsylvania rule as in accord with the English rule as
established in Eastwood vs. Kenyon twenty years before. Later cases,
however, show no regard for the limitations of the doctrine established
by the English rule and the Pennsylvania rule is still in "cloudland."
Another important class of cases is that in which a benefit is received by one without any solicitation on the part of the recipient, it
may be even without his knowledge. Is there a moral obligation of
sufficient solemnity in such a case to justify a court in treating it as a
consideration? It has been said that the rule recognizing such an obligation "has not been adopted unqualifiedly in this commonwealth." 5
Let us try to discover the qualifications.
As has already been pointed out the earliest Pennsylvania case 6
based on moral consideration was one of this kind. The promisor bad
received the benefit in ignorance that it was being conferred and without any solicitation. The promisee had conferred the benefit, not out
of a spirit of generosity toward the recipient, but because he could not
help it. An act was necessary for his own protection, and this act
must of necessity be beneficial to the promissor also. He does the act,
'Kline's Estate, 9 Dist. Reps. 386, Wilson vs. Wilson, 2 Pitts. Reps. 201,
and Kern's Estate, 171 Pa. 55.
234 W. N. C. 145.
3
1n Kennedy's Exs. vs. Ware, 1 Pa. 445, sufira.
438 Pa. 302.
5By Rice, J., in Brightly vs. McAleer, 3 Super. Ct. Reps. 442.
6
Greeves vs. McAllister, 2 Binney 591.
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involving expense, and then thinks of asking his friend to pay him for
the favor he has done him. A happy thought, that! His friend
agrees to pay. But later, when he has digested the situation, he
questions the obligation and is sued. The plaintiff's counsel had read
the note to Wennall vs. Adney and he frankly confessed in his brief
that he found nothing in it to encourage a hope of recovering. Great
must have been his surprise and pleasure when hc read the opinion of
the court. Rush, J., said :-"It
is extremely clear, that there was a
consideration in this case for the promise; because the defendant had,
in fact, derived a very important benefit and advantage at the expense
and labor of the plaintiff. When the interest of a man is promoted,
though not at his.request, and he deliberately after engages to pay for it,
the law very properly says, he sliall fulfill his promise ....
The old rule that an action will not lie, where the consideration is past,
has received a rational explanation from the liberal ideas that actuate
modern courts of justice. Though the service has been rendered prior
to the promise, yet if the party be under either a legal or moral obligation to pay, the promise will bind him." He later declares that, the
fact that benefit was unwittingly conferred by one acting in the pursuit
of his own interests, detracts not at all from the moral obligation of
the recipient of the benefit to pay for the benefit. In such cases "the
law will imply a request."
In Cunningham vs. Garvin' an assignor for the benefit of his
creditors had, as one of his assets, an uncompleted contract on which
a large part of the work had been done. The contract, however, provided that nothing should be payable on it till the work was completed.
The creditors were thus in danger of losing this large claim. At this
stage A, without any request from the.assignee or the creditors, steps
in and finishes the work. B, a creditor, recognizing the benefit thus
conferred, promises A to pay him for his work, and draws an order on,
the assignee for the amount reasonably due A. B later attempts to
revoke this order. The court held that it was supported by a sufficient
consideration, and therefore, constituted an irrevocable equitable assignment. Bell, J., said :-"Now, though anciently, this (a past consideration flowing from a benefit conferred) was thought inadequate to
support a present promise to pay, it has long been settled that a benefit
derived from the unsolicited services of another, creates a moralobligation of sufficient potency to sustain an express promise."
[To be continued.]
JOSPH P. MCKEnHAN.
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